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Insurance to Unemployment
Abstract
This paper presents a framework for analyzing the relation of
unemployment insurance to unemployment and applies the framework to
evaluate recent developments in the UI literature and future research
needs. Unemployment is decomposed into more basic elements related
to the labor market flows which determine unemployment incidence and
duration. It is also disaggregated by reason for unemployment —-
e.g.,entry into the labor force or quit last job. A matrix
containing those definitional elements of unemployment which are
potentially affected by the UI system forms the basis for organizing
the discussion. Each component of unemployment which may be affected
by variations in characteristics of the UI system is considered in
turn. The discussion of each of these elements focuses on recent
theoretical arid empirical studies which analyze how they are influenced
by features of the UI system. By proceeding systematically through the
elements which comprise unemployment and considering the major behavioral
explanationslinking the unemployment insurance system to unemployment,
itis possible to determine where the analysis has proceeded satisfactorily




Hanover, New Hampshire 03755
603/646—2641The literature exploring the effects of unemployment insurance (UI) on
unemployment has grown rapidly in recent years. The scope of its coverage
has widened and the sophistication of analyses has increased. Such diverse
topics as the effects of parameters of the payroll tax schedule on labor
force turover (Frank Brechling, 1979), the implications of the benefit
schedule for labor force participation (Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1979a), the impact
of limitations on the duration of UI benefits for the duration of
unemployment (Robert Moffit and Walter Nicholson, 1979), and the effects of UI
eligibility rules on quit unemployment (Stephen T. Marston, 1979), were covered
in papers from 1979 alone. This literature has been surveyed thoroughly
and insightfully by Gary Fields (1977) Daniel Hamermesh (1977) (1978b),
Finis Welch (1977) and Robert Topel and Finis Welch (1979).
Despite this recent progress, those designing policy and planning the
research agenda within the Labor Department and other interested researchers
do not have available a clear framework to guide them in fitting together
the results of these diverse studies, and to help them determine in a
systematic way what information is required if a complete picture of the
relation of unemployment insurance to unemployment is to emerge. The purpose
of this paper is to fill that gap by presenting a framework for analysis,
illustrating its relation to recent developments in the literature and
applying it to provide an indication of research needs)
1Although a large number of articles are discussed, thispaper is not
meant to provide a complete survey of the literature. An effort has been
made, however, to include the most important of the recent contributions.2
In focusing on the relation of the UI system to unemployment, and in
further restricting the discussion to implications of UI on the microeconomic
level, a number of potentially important benefits of the UI system are not
discussed. Subjects which are not analyzed here include:
a) the role of UI as an automatic stabalizer (see Hamermesh, 1977,
and George M. Von.Furstenberg, 1976);
b) the impact of UI on consumption patterns (see Haniermesh, 197gb);
c)the value of any redistribution of income which is brought about
by the UI system (see, however, Martin S. Feldstein, 1974, and Ronald G.
Ehrenberg, Robert Hutchens and Robert Smith, 1978 and Hamermesh, 1977, 1980);
d) UI's impact on the quality of job matches (except as improved
matches affect later unemployment);
e) the value of reduced uncertainty created by the availability of
insurance and any resulting changes in behavior, such as increased occupational
specialization. (See the discussion of UI as insurance in Topel and Welch, 1979)
1One must be very careful in attributing either benefits or costs to our
public UI system to recognize that in the absence of a federal program, the
demand for insurance would have led to the emergence of private programs, at
least in the case of larger firms which could take advantage of economies of
scale. Indeed, there were some union—based UI programs in existence before
the law establishing the UI system was passed. If the development of
unemployment insurance as a fringe benefit followed the course taken by
pensionprograms during the post—war period, for example, private UI would
have become available in union markets and perhaps also in the nonunion sector.
Thus,while the provision through the public sector of unemployment insurance
to workers may affect the likelihood of unemployment in comparison with a
counter-factual situation where no UI program is available, in evaluatiny
the effects of a public UI program, it would seem most appropriate to assume
that in theabsence of a public program private insurance would have been
availableto many covered workers. To the extent that such problems as
moralhazard would have to be faced by privately run UI programs, the public
system of unemployment insurance is not completely responsible fordesirable or
adverseimpacts associated with the existence of unemployment insurance, per se.3
Since the discussion does not focusonsome of the important, intended
effects of the UI system, it would be inappropriate to derive from it any
broadconclusions about the relative costs and benefits of the UI system.
In principle, the study of how a public policy affects some economic
outcome should be relatively straightforward. First a model explaining
how the dependent variable——the economic outcome——is determined in the
absence of the program would either be developed for the problem at hand,
or if already available, simply be applied. Second, the public policy
wouldbe introduced into the model as a constraint. The new outcome would
be seen to be determinedby the parameters of the public policy program and
thebasic relationships which determined the outcome in the absence of the
program. To test the effects of the policy on the outcome, major determ-
inants of the dependent variable exclusive of the policy would be standard-
ized for, appropriate econometric adjustments made ifrequired,and the
effectsof policy parameters onthe outcome measured.
Thereis, however, an important complication which, although not unique
to the analysis of the UI system, is more pronounced for studies of the
relation of UI to unemployment than it is for analyses of many other public
policies in the labor market. Specifically, neither the dependent variable
nor the policy has only a single dimension. Nor is there only a single
behavioral relation linking the policy to the outcome. In the case of the
dependent variable, there are different subgroups of the unemployed--job
leavers, those on temporary or permanent layoff, other job losers, entrants.
Moreover, as the literature on unemployment hastaught us, unemployment is4
a dynamic, nota static phenomenon.1 The unemployed is an everchanging
group of individuals, some just entering the pool of unemployed, others
leaving. The various labor market flows which determine an individual's
unemployment experience are reflected in such measures as the probability
of losing the last job through an indefinite layoff, the probability of
becoming unemployed after such a job loss, and eventually the probability
of exiting unemployment, either as a result of securing a new job or of
leaving the labor force.
The UI system includes sets of rules and schedules which are charac-
terized by complex relations among earnings, benefits, taxes, and unem-
ployment experience. The large set of behavioral considerations linking
the various flows comprising unemployment with the UI system reflects the
existence of many kinds of decisions required of both demanders and suppliers
of laborin the alternative circumstances which they face. Thus instead
of a simple dependent and independent variable, we have a large set of
possibleoutcomes and a complex set of policy parameters.
The first part of this paper develops the framework for viewing studies
of the relation of the UI system to unemployment. The framework is then
used as an outline for a discussion of the theoretical and empirical
developments in the literature. A final section takes note of the questions
for future research that emerge from the discussion.
'For recent discussions of unemployment and the labor market flows
which determine it, see papers by Feldstein, (1973), George Perry, (1972),
Stephen T. Marston, (1976) ,KimB. Clark and Lawrence H. Summers, (1979),
and Ronald G. Ehrenberg, (1979).I. Analytical Framework
This section sets out the analytical framework. Three steps are in-
volved. First, the number unemployed, the dependent variable, is decomposed
into more basic elements. Second, the dimensions of UI policy are
specified. Third, the theories linking the UI system to the elements
comprising unemployment are explored.
A.Decomposing Unemployment
Reasonsfor Becoming Unemployed
To begin, classify the unemployed according to the previous state they
were in before becoming unemployed, andaccordingto the nature of the
separation from that previous state. The number who are newly unemployed





where p=numberof newly unemployed.
=numberof newly unemployed on temporary layoff.
p2 =numberof newly unemployed on permanent layoff.
113 =numberof newly unemployed separated for other reasons (with
no expectation of recall).
study by Linda Leighton and Jacob Mincer (1979) analyzing the reasons
for youth unemployment provided thebasisfor the procedure followed here in
disaggregating unemployment by category and into more basic flows. Martin S.
Feldstein (1975) and Robert E. Hall (1978) discuss disaggregating the unem-
ployed into the groups such as those specified in Equation 1. In this
framework, new entrants andreentrantshave been combined in a single
category. It should be noted, however, that some reentrants may be eligible
for UI benefits, while new entrants are not. Therefore, itmay at times
be important to distinguish among these two types of entrants.6
=numberofnewly unemployed who are job leavers.
p5
=numberof newly unemployed who are entrants.
Incidence
Afurther decomposition of each of the 5 subgroups comprisingthe
newly unemployed can be accomplished by recognizingthat p is equal to
the product of a transition probability (p.)and the relevant stock of
individuals (S.) from which the flow into unemployment originated.
=pS. (2)
The relevant stock for i=l to 4 is the number employed.For i=5, it is the
number not in the labor force. p. may itself bebroken up into the product
of two probabilities. For example, the transition probabilityfrom em-
ployment into unemployment due to a quitis the product of the probability
of an employed person quitting and the probabilityof unemployment cond-
itional on having quit.
=y.z. (3)
The marginal probability of a separation fromthe previous state is y. and
the associated conditional probability of beingunemployed given a separation
is z..1
Duration
The basic elements in Equations 1 through 3 refer tothe incidence of
(flow into) unemployment. In describing theother major component of7
unemployment, one speaks either of the flow out of unemployment, the
continuation rate which is one minus that flow, or the duration of unem-
ployment. The relation between the duration of unemployment associated
with group i of the unemployed (d.) and the continuation rates for those
in group i (rk) is
00
d.=[k-r. r. r... .r. (1 —r.H
k=O 1,0 i,l i,2 i,k—l i,k
where r.=1.r. is the probability that a person unemployed at the
1,
beginningof period k for reason i will also be unemployed during period
k+l. The product of the rk's in the first set of parentheses represents
the probability of a person who becomes unemployed at the beginning of
period 1 remaining unemployed throughout the periods before period k.
(1 -r.isthe probability of leaving unemployment at theend of period
k,given that the individual was unemployed during that period.
Expanding the expression and collecting terms, we have
00k
d. = ( IT r. (4)
k=lj1i,k—j
This is the expression for the duration cf completed spells of unemployment.
It will not be equal to the average duration of spells of unemployment in
process such as one obtains from cross—section CPS data (assuming a steady8
state) unless r does not vary with unemployment duration (k)
Unemployment
Assuming a steady state, the expression for the total number who are
unemployed in any period for reason i is givenby2
k
U.=
1-1. ( TI r.k'
1
wherer.k. =1for k-j =0.The total number unemployed in subgroup i is
equal to the sum of the p. people who have just become unemployed,the
fraction r1 of the p. people who first became unemployed one period
before that, and so on. From Equation 4 it can be seen that the expression
1Notethat ifcontinuation rates are constant over all k periods, the
averagedurationof completed spells is simply
.Therelation between
the duration of interrupted spells and the duration of completed spells
depends on the distribution of the r1 k-jSpecifically, Stephen Salant
(1977) demonstrates formally that the relationship depends on the variance
in the length of completed spells. He emphasizes that one cannot infer from
the fact that current measured unemployment spells are longer for one group
than for another that the completed spells will also be longer for the former
group. On this subject, see also the papers by Hyman W. Kaitz (1970),
Robert H. Frank (1978), Tony Lancaster (1979) and Stephen Nickell (1979).
Using the notation developed above, but dropping the subscript i, it







where rk. =1for k-j <0.This will be equal to if r is independent
of duration.
2For our purposes the assumption of a steady (Continued on page 9)r)
tothe right of p. in Equation 5 is equal to the expected duration of a
completed spell of unemployment, d.. Thus we have the well known result
that in a steady state, the total number unemployed (for a particular
reason) is equal to the product of incidence and duration of completed
spells.
U. =]4.d. (6) 1 11
Overallunemployment can be obtained by summing across the i subgroups.
U =U. (7) 1 1
UIand Elements of Unemployment
The effect of variations in unemployment insurance can be introducedin
ageneral way by recognizing that the flow of newly unemployed in group i
the associated stocks of employed or those not in the labor force(Si),
the transition probability (p.), the marginal and conditional probabilities
underlying p. (y. and z.), the duration of unemployment (d.) [or the
definitionallyrelated probabilities-—the continuation rates (r.k.)]
are all functions of parameters——yet to be specified——of the UI system, as
well as other variables. Accordingly, Equations 2 and6may be differen-
tiated torepresent the effects of a given change in the UI system. Since
the system of equations represents a steady state, differentiation corresponds
(Footnote 2 continued from page 8) state is adequate. If one were
concerned with UI and stabilization policy, this assumption would have to be relaxed. Itwould also have to be relaxed to analyze the impact
ofchanges in the UI system in the short run.10
tocomparing steady states.. Specifically we have
=(pS.d.+p.S'd.+p.S.d) (8)
11J]111 111
Inother words, the impact of a change in a particular feature of the UI
system on unemployment reflects its effect on the transition probability
of becoming unemployed, its effect on the number of those either employed
or not in the laborforce and its effect onduration. But this impact
alsois determined by the basic level of the transition probability, the
number of those employed or not in the labor force, and the average
duration of unemployment.
Although the result is not shown, by differentiating Equation 3 and
substituting for p. and p! in Equation 8, it is also possible to express
the effect of changes in UI on unemployment as functions of the level and
changes in the probabilities y. and z.. In sum, it has been shownthat
the overall effect of a change in UI onunemployment may be expressed as
functionsof subsets of ji.,p.,S., d., y. and z. and the partials of
these measures with respect to a change in the UI system, Ii!,SI,
d, y' and z'. Since theseelements are not all independent of one another,
1 1 1
valuesfor all of them are not required to evaluate the effect of a given
change in the UI system on unemployment. Nevertheless, if we are to fully
understand the effects of the UI system on unemployment, we should under-
stand its effects on each of these unemployment related flows.11
B. Features of the UI System
A second part of the analytical framework consists of a more detailed
look at the policy parameters of the UI system. The two major categories
into which the program features fall are benefits and taxes.
(1) To be eligible for benefits, the individual must have demonstrated
anattachment to the labor force by having met requirements as to
minimum earnings and/or length of employment in a covered job.
(2) The benefit structure is characterized by minimum and maximum
levels.
(3)There is a schedulerelating the level of benefits to past earnings.
Potentialduration of benefits may also vary with earnings history
with the exact relation differing among states.
(4)There is a set of rulesfor determining qualification. Criteria
includehaving an acceptable reason for separation from the job——
an individual who has voluntarily separated without good cause
may be disqualified from receiving benefits or may face a pro-
longed waiting period—-and a requirement that the individual
engagein active job search and be ready and willing to accept
an offer of suitable work.
(5)During times of high unemployment, job search requirements may
berelaxed and the period of potential benefits extended.
The UI system is financed by a 3.4 percent federal payroll tax. Credit
is given against the federal taxforemployer UI taxes paid to the state,
providedthat the state adopts an experience ratedsystem. With the credit
thefederal tax is .7 percent of the taxable payroll.1 Distinguishing
characteristics of the UI tax include the following:
(1)The UI tax is a payroll tax.
(2)There is a ceiling on taxablepayroll, currently $6,000 per covered
worker,set by the federal government. However, states may raise
the ceiling above this level.
1.2 percentage points of this tax is a temporarysurcharge until the
UItrust fund loans are repaid. The current estimate is that the surcharge
will remain in force until the late 1980's.12
(3)The tax paid on behalf of a worker who transfers from one
employer to another during the taxable year is not transferable.
(4) According to the predominant system of experience rating, a firm's
tax rate is based on the ratio of taxes collected in a reserve
fundafter charged benefits to the taxable payroll--where the
taxable payroll consists of earnings up to $6,000 for each covered
employee.'
(5)Thetax schedules are characterized by minimum ormaximumrates.
Aftersome point, the tax rate does not decline as benefit pay-
ments decrease so that for some firms, the tax contribution exceeds
benefitsdrawn by their employees. Other firms never contribute
as much as their employees draw.
(6) For those firms whosetaxrates are experience rated, the adjustment
intax rates to benefits paid is made with a lag.
C. Theoretical Linkages
The third part of the analytical framework consists of categories
derived from theory which indicate how and why the behavior of individuals
and firmsmaybe influenced by the UI system and its features. These
categoriesprovide "theoretical linkages" between the public policy and the
outcomemeasure of interest. On the supply side of the market, we have
the theory of labor leisure choice and the theory of occupational choice——
including relevant considerations from the theory of human capital and
compensating differentials. In addition, since there is uncertainty and
perhaps also imperfect knowledge, both search theory and the theoryof
insurance are relevant. On the demand side of the market, there is the
maximizationhypothesis underiyingthetheoryof derived demand, relevant
aspectsof human capital theory as it affects the behavior of the firm and
the theory of firm behavior in the face of uncertainty. Modifications of
the theory to reflect the influence of labor market institutions such
1The tax schedule for all employers in a state may be shifted in ac-
cordance with the current surplus or deficit position of the reserve fund
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as unions will be relevant if they affect the way in which the UI program
influences unemployment.
Figure 1 presents the basic features of the analytical framework.
The matrix on the left-hand side of the figure has as its elements the
partials of labor market flows with respect to variations in the parameters
of the UI system. Twopointsmay be made about this matrix. First,
notice that the market flows relating UI to unemployment are listed
hierarchically in column 1. Thus, it can be seen in column 1 of the
matrix that to understand how UI affects unemployment, one need not have
full information on each of the flows. For example, y and z, the
differences in the probabilities of separating from the previous state
and of becoming unemployed given a previous separation, when weighted,
determine the value of p, the change in the transition rate from the
previous state to unemployment associated with variation in some feature of
the UI system. Second, the proceeding discussion implies that to aggregate
the partials of more basic flows and determine their influence on unemploy-
ment, the partials must be weighted appropriately, e.g., as called for in
equation 8.
Each of the features of the UI system which may affect these flows is
listed in the right-hand column of Figure 1. The middle column of Figure 1
reports the major behavioral linkages explaining how and why varying features
of the UI system may change the unemployment related labor market flows.
Much of the rest of this paper is concerned with filling in the details
pertaining to the information in Figure 1.If we could fill in the first
row of the matrix in Figure 1, it would mean that we knew what the overall14
effect of the unemployment insurance system on unemployment was. As things
stand, we have most of the required inforamtion only for U, the difference
in temporary layoff unemployment induced by the UI system. Andeventhere,
much more work is called for.
At this point, one might consider again the need to analyze the relation
of the UI system to all of the flows which determine the level of unemploy-
ment by reason for unemployment. Instead of decomposing unemployment by
reason into the more basic flows which comprise incidence, or duration, why
not proceed directly to analyze the relation between the UI system and the
level of unemployment by reason? The answer is that these basic labor market
flows are not all determined by the same set of market forces. (Although,
as will be noted, there are forces creating interdependence among a number
of the flows, leading to behavioral relations that are more similar than one
might, at first, think). Accordingly, the effect of estimating directly
the relation between the UI system and the level of unemployment by reason
(except, perhaps, the level of temporary layoff unemployment) is to
obscure more basic underlying behavioral relations. In addition, any change
in the relation among structural equations will have the effect of altering
the reduced form relation explaining U' for reasons that cannot be determined
unless each of the underlying structural relations and their relations to
one another are understood.
It can be seen in Figure 1 that certain boxes corresponding to different
unemployment related flows, including that for U, have been checked. These
checks indicate that we have some reasonably reliable information ——either
at the empirical or theoretical level --concerningthe impact of some15
features of the UI system on the relevant flow. A check means that we know
at least a part of the relevant story -—not'thatall or most of the story
is available.
The discussion in the following section is organized according to the
elements of the matrix in Figure 1. It starts in row 1, column 1 and
proceeds element by element across the rows.
II. Recent Developments in the Literature
A. Impact of UI on the LevelofUnemployment: U
Temporary Layoff Unemployment: U
To begin thediscussion,focus on the impact of UI on temporary layoff
unemployment, which falls in the cell in row 1, column 1 of the matrix in
Figure 1.1 Relevant features of the UI system affecting temporary layoff
unemployment include both the benefit and tax schedules. Since temporary
layoff is usually of short duration, factors influencing the potential
duration of benefits are not relevant. Nor is the work test likely to
be important, at least for those with a firm date of recall. The important
feature is the level of benefits as determined by the workers past earnings
andemployment history, and in some cases, number of dependents.
On the tax side, the amount of UI payroll taxes paid by a firm CT)
isequal to the product of the tax rate (A) and the taxable payroll (TP)
T=ATP
1Temporary layoff may be defined in a number of ways. For example, the
categorymayinclude only those with a firm date of recall, those who have a
firm date of recall or expect to be recalled, or it may be defined in ex post
terms as those who were recalled. The definition differs among studies.I (j
Thetaxable payroll is equal to the sum of the taxable wages paid to each
worker during each calendar year, with the ceiling on taxable wages per worker
currently equal to $6000. A temporary layoff will not affect directly the
taxable payroll unless the worker will earn less than $6000. However, if
the quit rate from temporary layoff is higher than it is for employed workers,
and if those who quit are replaced, higher temporary layoff rates will be
associated with higher taxable payroll.1 The firm loses credit for taxes
paid on behalf of the worker who quit and must pay the tax on earnings,
up to $6000, paid during that same year to the worker's replacement.
The UI tax rate will vary when workers are temporarily laid off and
are paid benefits as long as the rate falls within the range where it is
experience rated.. To see how the tax rate is adjusted in light of the
1Donald 0. Parsons (1977,p. 199) notes that attrition from the total
of those on layoff status is about 10 to 20 percent per month.17
firm's experience, consider the reserve ratio system which is in place in
32 states.1 The idea of the reserve ratio system of experience rating is to
have the tax rate vary with the amount of reserves in the firm's account
relative to the firm's taxable payroll. Reserves are accumulated from taxes
paid in excess of benefits, or may be negative if benefits paid exceed taxes
for a long enough period. The rate increases (decreases) whenever benefits
paid to the firm's employees exceed (fall below) tax receipts from the firm.
The tax rates are adjusted along a schedule until the flow of benefits and flow
of taxes are equalized, or until it hits a ceiling or floor.
To help describe the relation of the tax rate to labor turnover, a
simplified version of a diagram from a study by Frank Brechling and
Christopher Jehn (1978) is presented in Figure 2. The tax schedule is






1Systems in operation in the other states are analyzed by Eleanor Brown
(1979). Brown also considers the tax costs of changing the size of the firm's
labor force.
2Actual tax schedules, as discussed by Brechling and Jehn and Topel and
Welch (1979), may be more complex. For example, the segment de is not smooth,
but consists of discontinuous jumps. In some cases, the tax rate may vary
with reserves even in the range of negative reserves. For a more complete
description, see the very thorough study by Joseph M. Becker (1972).18
It canbe seen that firms located on the segments ab ,cd,andefhave
taxrates which are not experience rated, &Lthougn, as noted there may be some
variation in the tax rate due to the discontinuous jump, bc. Firms with tax rates
which are not experience rated have extreme turnover rates which are either
relatively very high or relatively very low. A firm whose employees con-
sistently collect benefits that exceed the amount of payroll taxes that are
generated when the maximum UI tax rate is charged against its taxable payroll
not only has negative reserves, but in the absence of a floor, would have ever
declining reserves. A firm whose workers infrequently receive UI benefits
may consistently generate more revenue than its workers receive in benefits.
Thus it would have positive reserves and unless the minimum tax rate were
zero, in the absence of a ceiling the firm could have ever growing reserves.1
The rate of adjustment in tax ratesbrought about by the effects of changing
turnoveron reserves determines the speed with which the tax flow changes
in response to changes in benefits, and thus the speed of adjustment of the
system. The steeper is de ,themore rapid is the adjustment.
It is worth restating how temporary layoffs affect payroll taxes. As
long as actualearnings are well above the maximum earnings subject to the
tax,except for quits from layoffs there is no effect of temporary layoffs
on taxable payroll. Moreover, if the firm's tax rate is at the ceiling or
the floor, the tax rate is not affected by temporary layoffs either. The
firms which pay higher taxes when temporarily laying off their work force
are those with a tax rate within the range where it is experience rated. For
those firms, their tax rate is adjusted, although with a lag, so that in the
steady state, the flow of taxes offsets the flow of benefits paid periodically
to those on temporary layoff.
1For a description of how individual state systems adjust to large
accumulated surplusses or deficits in the firms' accounts, see Becker (1972).19
The Basic Theory of ru and Temporary Layoff Unemployment
Martin Feldstein's (1976) theoretical analysis explores the implications
of imperfect experience rating and a subsidy to recipients of UI payments
which is due to the tax free status of UI benefits. (Current tax law
exempts UI payments from theincometax for those earning less than $20,000.)
On the supply side, the linkage between the UI system and unemployment is
provided by the labor—leisure choice model in the context of an analysis of
compensating differentials. On the demand side, the analysis is grounded
in the theory of the firm--derived demand.
To simulate the effects of fluctuations in output demand, it is
assumed in the model that market price is depressed for a specified fraction
of the year. The firm is able to sell all that it produces at whatever
the current price is, but does not store output for later sale. To focus
the analysis on temporary layoff unemployment, it is also assumed that
workers are permanently attached to the firm. Then, constraining the
money wages paid to be the same in the on and off season, Feldstein asks
whatcombination of wage and employment policy would minimize labor costs,
and what difference unemployment insurance makes to the calculation. Without
addressingdirectly the question of the shifting of the payroll tax, the
model allows UI tax payments to be a function of total UI benefits paid.
The value of UI benefits net of the income tax and the UI payroll tax enters
into the worker's calculations.
Feldstein's analysis explains why firms which experience seasonal
fluctuationsin demand and faceUI tax schedules that areimperfectly
experience rated are encouraged to lay off more workers than they would20
if the firm paid the full cost of benefits received by their workers --
i.e.,if there were complete experience rating. The income tax exemption
for UI benefits is also shows to encourage layoffs.
It is interesting to take note of the very simple effect UI has in a
static model in which there is no uncertainty and a supply curve to the firm
that is perfectly elastic in terms of utility equivalents —-i.e.,in which
labor supply to the firm is perfectly elastic, but the wage (height of the
elastic labor supply curve) is adjusted to reflect the value of nonwage
elements of the compensation package. If UI benefits are taxable as ordinary
income, the effect of unemployment is to reduce wages, replacing a compensa-
ting differential which otherwise would arise to equate returns to those in
occupations with and without unemployment. A fully experience rated tax
raises the firm's costs by as much as the UI benefits reduce them, leaving
no net effect of a perfectly rated UI system.
Feldstein's study provides a framework which is extremely useful for
understanding the impact of UI taxes in the context of a market structure
in which possibilities for substitution exist both on the supply and demand
sides of the labor market.1 A point stressed in the paper is that if a
1Kenneth Burdett and Bryce Hool (1979) extend Feldstein's analysis to the
case where workers face an imperfect capital market, limiting their ability to
borrow and lend. In such a circumstance, the pattern of consumption over time
becomes tied to the pattern of the earnings stream,rather than simply to its
present value. UI may then substitute for the rolO played by the capital
market, allowing consumption to take on a more ideal pattern over time, even
in the face of unemployment. Daniel Hamermesh (l979b) finds that the true
situation lies between the extremes of perfect and imperfect capital markets.
Thus,while for some the funds provided by UI effectively relax a borrowing
constraint and allow increased current consumption, others treat the benefits as
additions to permanent income, increasing consumption in current and future
periods.21
long—run view is taken of choice on the supply side, much of temporary
layoff unemployment is voluntary. It results from the choice of an occupa-
tion with a known expected unemployment experience. This is so even though
any particularincidence of unemployment may be involuntary.
While thetheory is applied to analyze temporary layoffs, there is no
reason why this general approach may not be used to explain that portion
of permanent layoffs which are recurrent and expected——e.g., in the
construction industry. Some required mofidifications are discussed below.
Martin Baily (1977i) has written a paper which differs in some detail
from, but is closely related to Feldstein's. It assumes a two—period model
in which workers formulate expectations as to the firm's behavior in response
to demand fluctuations. The supply price of labor is based on these expec-
tations and opportunities elsewhere. The firm in Baily's model is free
to adjust hiring and hours worked in both periods.' As in Feldstein's
paper, demand fluctuations are represented by variations in output price.
However, in this model, workers may search for a new job from layoff, but
at a cost. They will do so if the expected benefits warrant it.
The Feldstein-Baily theoretical structure is elaborated on in a paper
by Frank Brechling (1979),in which he includes a complex specification
for the UI payroll tax structure and examines the effect of the UI system on
the firm's incentives to engage in temporary layoffs. The Brechling analysis
concentrates on the demand side of the market.
John Abowd and Orley Ashenfelter (1979) analyze in further detail the
roles of compensating differentials for unemployment and of unemployment
'Topel and Welch (1979) analyze this result in some detail. They note
that subsidized UI benefits may lead firms toreduce weeks per year worked
per employee, while expanding the size of the labor force.22
insurancein influencing labor supply. In their mode',it is recognized
explicitly that workers are not free to choose hours of work for those
jobs which are characterized by involuntary unemployment. The constraint
is built into the specification of the labor supply curve.
Looking back at the list of theoretical linkages in Figure 1 and
comparing it to the behavior analyzed in the papers mentioned above, it
appears that the impact of the UI system on temporary layoff has yet to be
analyzed in a model which fully treats two important aspects of behavior --
adjustmentsto risk and uncertainty and specific training. The role of UI
as insurance has received some attention (see, for example, Frank Stafford's
(1977) paper and the discussions by Topel and Welch (1979) and Ithowd and
Ashenfelter (1979) ),buthave yet to be incorporated in a full model
analyzing the impact of UI on temporary layoffs which considers both the supply
and demand sides of the market. Similarly, interactions between specific
training and unemployment insurance and the reasons why these may affect the
probability of temporary layoff have not been analyzed adequately. An
important reason for believing that specific training and unemployment
insurance may interact is that imperfect experience rating reduces the cost
to the firm of placing workers on recall layoff, rather than keeping them on the
payroll but underemployed. Since workers with specific training are the ones
the firm would most like to retain in the long run, and the UI subsidy
reduces the cost of retaining them, it may lower the costs of maintining a
work force which has a high level of specific training.
Empirical Analyses of Temporary Layoff Unemployment
Feldstein (1978) estimates the relation of the temporary layoff unem-
ployment rate to predicted UI benefit-replacement rates (benefit-wage23
ratios) and finds strong evidence of an important relationship.1 More
specifically, he estimates an equation based on data from the March 1971
Current Population Survey. The dependent variable is a binary variable
indicating whether the individual is on temporary layoff. The independent
variables incorporate predicted values of UI benefits as a percent of net wages,
which are available both for those who were and were not unemployed during
the period of observation, demographic characteristics and measures indicating
occupation industry and union membership. Ordinary least squares is used.
The temporary unemployment rate for the sample was 1.6 percent. Coeffi-
cient estimates for various versions of the benefit measure suggest that in
comparison with no UI system, the temporary layoff unemployment rate has
been raised by roughly one-half by the current, average level of benefits.2
Variation in UI benefits is found to have the greatest effect when benefit-
replacement rates lie above 30 to 50 percent. No direct measure of the
degree of experience rating is incorporated in Feldstein's estimates. The
exact interpretation of the coefficient of the UI benefit measure -—i.e.,
what part of the variation in temporary layoffs should be attributed to
which parameters of the UI benefit and tax schedules —-dependson the
relation among the parameters and the resulting relation between the degree
of experience rating and benefit levels.
1Hutchens (1979) paper includes an empirical analysis of a supply side
relation consistent with the structural supply equation in the Baily-Feldstein
model. His analysis considers both temporary and permanent layoffs.
2Remember the caveat noted earlier. If there were no public UI system,
some alternative system with unknown characteristics would have emerged. That
system, however, is likely to have been fully experience rated, so that UI
benefits and tax payments would not only match at the aggregate (state)
level, as they now do over the long term, but there would be no cross-
subsidy among firms within each state.24
What one cannot tell from these results is the importance of worker
attachment to the firm. Feldstein's model assumes permanent attachment.
Asnoted, taxable payroll is unlikely to be affected in that circumstance
by temporary layoff. To the extent that seasonal separations in construc-
tion are permanent, taxable payroll may be increased by turnover. This
phenomenon is further analyzed in the discussion of permanent layoffs.1
Unemployment for Reasons Other Than Temporary Layoff: U, U, U, U
Looking across row1of the Table in Figure 1, the other unemployment
measures which may be affected by the UI system are unemployment due to
indefinite layoff, other job loss, job leaving or entry. As noted in the
introduction to this section, no direct information is available on the
effect of UI on the level of unemployment for each of these reasons. Infor-
mation is available on the impact of UI on the underlying flows found in
rows 2 to 5 of the table. We turn now to a discussion of that information.
1Terrence C. Halpin (1979) finds a negative impact of the relation
of taxable to total wage base on seasonal fluctuations in .construction
employment, but not on seasonal fluctuations in employment for two other
industrieshe analyzes——women's, misses' and junior's outerwear, and
millwork,plywood, veneer and other prefabricated wood products. There
is a further discussion of these results below.25
B.Impact of UI on the Incidence of Unemployment: p (row 2)
Stephen T. Marston's (1979) study of the impact of the UI system on
the incidence of unemployment for those who quit is the only study to be
classified as fallingin one of the categories indicated in row 2 ——
i.e.,to be concerned directly with the impact of the UI system on the
incidence of unemployment. In the case of those who quit, the state's
eligibility rules are a major determinant of the expected value of UI
benefits. In some states, the waiting period is prolonged for job
leavers. In others, they are barred from collecting benefits at all.
Marston uses as a measure of the value of UI benefits a measure of
benefits weighted by the fraction of the spell over which an individual
can collect. His regressions are based on pooled CPS data for three
years. Independent variables include demographic factors, labor market
variables including the wage and broad occupational dummies. Marston
can find no significant effect of the expected benefit level on quits.
Thus there is no evidence that making UI benefits available to those
who quit encourages quits.
The theoretical basis for Marston's analysis of quits is rooted in
the supply side of the market. An analysis based on the demand side is
presented by Brechling. That study, which is discussed in the appropriate
section below, focuses on the incentives of the firm to follow policies
which lower the quit rate ——acomponent of the incidence of quit
unemployment. Neither the theoretical framework in Marston's study nor26
the empirical analysis incorporates the role of specific training (job
tenure)
1
C.The Impact of UI on Transition Probabilities into Unemployment: p
As is apparent from the table in Figure 1, none of the relevant
studies has examined the impact of UI on this transition probability.
As will be seen, however, there is important, related theoretical and
empirical work at a slightly more disaggregated level of analysis --i.e.
on the probability of leaving employment or not in labor force status.
D.The Probability of Leaving Employment or Not in the Labor Force
Status: y
Incidence of Temporary Layoffs:
Using BLS establishment survey data and data pertaining to certain
parameters of state UI systems, Frank Brechling (1979) attempts a further
test of the Feldstein-Baily analysis of the relation of UI to the incidence
of temporary layoffs. He points out that the existence of a feedback effect
of UI benefits on wages is a key to the prediction of the Baily-Feldstein
model that with current income tax treatment of UI benefits and imperfect
experience rating, an increase in UI benefits increases layoffs. In the
absence of such a feedback effect, the higher the benefits, the higher the
cost of temporary layoffs to those firms which are not at the maximum tax
rate. But a firm whose workers do not value the higher UI benefits will not
face a lower wage to compensate (or more than compensate) for the tax
costs. Thus the firm has less incentive to engage in temporary layoffs if
there is no feedback effect of UI benefits on wages.
1Leighton and Mincer (1979) present an analysis of the implications of
job tenure for quits. J. Peter Mattila (1974) has pointed to the tendency for
those who quit to move directly from one job to another -—underliningthe
importance of distinguishing between the incidence of quit related unemploy-
ment and the probability of a quit.27
Brechling does not standardize for many of the exogenous measures
included in Feldstein's empirical analysis (1978). Nor is there any
standardization for the role of human capital. He does, however, specify
in more detail than in Feldstein the role of the parameters which determine
the shape of the UI payroll tax function as illustrated in Figure 2 above,
noting, in addition, that the parameter of the UI system employed by
Feldstein ——thefraction of benefits charged to the firm ——maybe
endogenous to the analysis.1
Findings from Brechling's empirical analysis are (as Brechling views
them), only a first, rough attempt at estimation. Not only are there the
ominissions noted above, but dependent variables refer to aggregated
categories which may include permanent layoffs. Moreover, the benefit
measure used in industry equations refers to the average value for the
state. It is not a parameter from the benefit schedule, nor is it
calculated separately by industry. Nevertheless, it is of interest to
note that the coefficient estimates which indicate the impact of benefits
and tax parameters are consistent with a Baily—Feldstein type of model.2
1Brechling also discusses and estimates the impact of UI benefits on hours
worked and on duration. The duration results are discussed in the relevant
section below.
2Brechling finds a positive effect of the benefit level on layoffs, with
a t-ratio greater than 1.5 in 8 of 16 industries. But although the sign is
positive, the t—statistic is less than 1.5 for the benefit variable in an
equation computed with data for all of the industries taken together. An
equal numberofpositive and negative coefficients with t's above 1.5 is
estimated for benefits in the equations with recalls or hours worked specified
as the dependent variable.28
The findings with respect to tax rates support the view that layoffs
and recalls are responsive to the degree of experience rating. While no
measures are incorporated in Brechling's study to indicate how many firms face,
or what fraction of benefits paid are to workers of firms facing,the
maximum or minimum tax rates, these findings indicate that variation in
the parameters of the tax rate schedule have the expected influence. An
increase in the maximum tax increases the range for experience rating
and is associated with reduced layoffs and rehires. An increase in the
minimum tax rate reduces the range over which experience rating applies,
and as would be expected, is found to increase the rates of layoffs and
rehires
Incidence of P3rmanent Layoffs,y: The Theory
It has been noted above that payroll taxes paid are equal to the
product of the tax rate and taxable payroll. Each of these elements may
be influenced by the number (flow) of permanent layoffs. The basic
theoretical work analyzing this relationship is due to Brechling (1977).
The new element there is the relation between turnover rates and the taxable
payroll—-a relation thatmay be traced to the effect of the ceiling on
earnings subject to the payroll tax. When a worker is separated from
'In the layoff equations for a total of 16 industries, the measure of
the ceiling tax rate has a negative coefficient with a t statistic above
1.5 in 11 industries and a positive coefficient with a t above 1.5 in none.
In the rehire equations the corresponding numbers are 6 and 0. The minimum
tax rate has a positive coefficient with a t above 1.5 in 5 equations
explaining layoffs and a negative coefficient with a t above 1.5 in 2
equations. For rehires the numbers for the coefficients of the minimum
taxvariableare 6 and 3.29
the firm and not replaced, if the worker has not yet earned the full
$6000 during the calendar year, the separation reduces the taxable
payroll. If $6000 hasalreadybeen earned, the layoff does not immediately
reduce the taxable payroll, but will beginning the next year. Paying a
benefit to the worker who separates (e.g., because he does not locate a
job immediately after layoff) reduces the size of the reserve fund. If
reserves fall relative to taxable payrolls as long as the tax rate is on
the portion of the schedule that is experience rated, there subsequently
will be an adjustment in the tax rate. If the tax rate is not experience
rated, the only effect of the layoff on the firm related to the UI system) is
that taxes to be paid are reduced because the taxable payroll is
reduced.
Turn now to the case of recurring permanent layoffs where, at some time
after the layoff, the worker is replaced. How might such layoffs with
replacement occur? In some industries, e.g., construction, permanent layoffs
and separation from the contractor commonly follow the completion of a job.
More generally, quits from temporary layoff turn them into permanent
1
layoffs expos. But a worker let go as a result of a downward fluc-
tuation in demand may also be replaced when that fluctuation is reversed.
Brechling has analyzed the incentive for the firm to reduce turn-
over—anincentive created by the existence of a ceiling on wages paid to
an individual that are subject to a payroll tax. The reason for this
1Quits from layoff are examined by John M. Barron and Wesley
Mellow, (1980).30
incentive is as follows. A firm cannot claim credit for the tax paid
duringthe calendar year by another employer on behalf of a newly hired
employee.Nor when calculating the tax to be paid on behalf of a worker's
replacement canitclaim credit for the tax it paid during the calendar
year on behalf of an employee who has since departed. As long as a
worker's wage exceeds the maximum yearly wage subject to the UI tax,
some of the worker's earnings will be tax free. But if the worker turns
over during the year and is replaced, a tax must be paid on the earnings
of both the worker who left and the replacement.1 This means there is
a penalty for turnover even if the workers who leave e.çperience no
unemployment before securing a new or if, because of their unemployment
history, workers who leave are ineligible for UI benefits.2 Because of
1For example, with a tax base of $6,000 andyearly earnings of $15,000,
ifthe worker stays with the firmfor the full year, tax must be paid on
$6,000of earnings. If a worker quits or is dismissed in the middle of the
yearandis replaced, $12,000 of the earnings paid for a single year of work issubject to the tax. A turnover with replacement that occurs near the
beginning or end of the year may involve a smaller cost to the firm than one
in the middle of the year.
2Brechling demonstrates that at a taxablewage base equal to
one—half of the worker's yearly earnings, the firm has the greatest incentive
to reduce turnover. The incentive provided by the relation between permanent
turnover and the taxable payroll is strongest in the case of firms which are
subject to the maximum or minimum tax rates. For in this case, there is no
initial balance between the flow of UI benefits paid and the flow of UI taxes.
Thus, an increase in the taxable payroll associated with higher turnover will
raise not just the stock of reserves, but the yearly flow of taxes into the
UI system. This will be so whether or not higher permanent turnover is
associated with higher benefit payments.31
therelation between separation rate and the amountofthe wage bill subject
to tax, a rise in the separation rate due to permanent layoffs may affect
the payrolltax costs to the firmwhether or not there is perfect experience
rating.But thenature of the effect will depend on whether the firm's
currenttaxrate is experience rated.
These relations can be seen most easily by considering payroll taxes in
a steady state. Following Brechling, along the experience rated portion of
the tax schedule, the tax rate (A) is given by
R A =a-
wherea is the intercept of the experience rated portion of the tax schedule
in Figure 2 and s is its slope. R is the absolute amount of reserves. As
noted previously, TP is the firm's taxable payroll. If the steady state
equilibrium occurs along the experience rated portion of the tax schedule,
theflow of taxes (T) and benefits (B) are equalized
A TP=B
Substitutingintothe equilibrium condition the equation for the tax rate,
reserves inthe steady state are given by
R =-(aTP-B).
The tax rate is simply32
A
TP
Since increased turnover rates raisethe taxable payroll, in the steady
state,higher turnover raises the required stock of reserves andmaylower
the tax rate. As long as the tax rate remains experience rated, the per
period flow of taxes changes only in accordance with any addition to
charged benefits associated with higher turnover.
Theabove discussionassumes that the firm's tax rate is experience
rated.With a turnover rate too highfor experience rating (for firms on
theleft-hand portion of the tax schedule), the taxflowin equilibrium
is less thanthebenefit flow,
A TP <B.
The opposite is true for firms (on the right—hand side of the schedule) with
very low turnover. For both groups, anything that increases the taxable
payrollwill increase the flow of taxes. Thus, anincrease in the per
periodrates of permanent layoff will raise the flow of taxes, although it
will not affect the tax rate.
Note that quit rates from layoff are likely to be higher the further
away the expected recall date and the less firmtheprospect for recall.
Since the value of UI benefits drawn by a worker varies negatively with
the quit rate from layoff, other things the same, firms with no experience
ratingwill have the greatest incentive to33
offera certain date of recall and avoid the increase in payroll tax
costs associated with turnover and replacement.
Incidence of Permanent Layoffs,y: Empirical Evidence
Totest for any effects of the ceiling on taxable payroll and para-
meters of the tax structure on turnover, Frank Brechling and Christopher
Jehn (1978) estimate equations with turnover rates as dependent variables
and maximum taxable payroll and tax parameters as independent variables.1
Their data is from the establishment survey and is aggregated into categories
by two digit manufacturing industry, state and year. They do not have
separatedata on rates of temporary and permanent layoffs, but in addition
toinformation on total layoff rates they know the accession andrehire
rates. The parameters of the tax rate schedule are found to have effects
in the expected direction. These effects are very similar to those noted
in the preceeding discussion of Brechling's findings in his paper on
temporary layoffs. The impact of the ceiling on earnings subject to
the UI payroll tax is also in the expected direction. As the theory leads
one to expect, the greatest impact on permanent turnover occurs where the
ceiling on wages subject to the UI tax is roughly one half of average
wages. These results are especially strong for quits and are discussed
below.
1An intermediate step in studying the effects of the tax structure and
experience rating on turnover is to determine the distribution of firms
along the segments of the tax schedule in Figure 2. For evidence on the
amountof benefits paidtoworkers from firms with tax rates that are not
experience rated, see Becker (1972) and Topel and Welch (1979).34
Incidence of Permanent Layoffs, y2: Remaining Issues
Brechling and Jehn's study is rooted in demand theory. To gain a more
completeunderstanding of the effects of the UI tax system and imperfect
experienceratingon permanent layoffs, it will be necessary to build
into their model a supply side equation indicating the impact of UI
benefits and the probability of layoffs on the wage. This is essentially
the strategy Brechling followed in attempting to integrate his work on
temporary layoffs with that of Feldstein.
A supply side analysis which could be merged vith Brechling's demand
side framework to make a more complete structural model is contained in
Robert Hutchens' (1979) paper. He analyzes the tradeoff on the supply
side between wages and the probability of a layoff, incorporating into
his analysis the role of UI benefits.1
What other factors should be brought into the discussion of the
relationof the UI system to permanent layoff? Consider in this context
the role of specific training. It has already been mentioned that there
is a complementary relationship between imperfect experience rating,
temporarylayoffs and specific training because imperfect experience rating
subsidizes temporary layoffs and reduces the cost of retaining specifically
'Hutchens also provides some empirical estimates. His majorconcern
iswith the tradeoff between layoffs and wages. Accordingly, his investiga-
tion of the impact of the UI system is not very detailed. His results
suggest that more generous UI benefits are associated with higher probabilities
of layoff.35
trainedworkers during periods of depressed demand. There are also other
reasons why the ul system and specific training interact to influence
jointly the firm's layoff policies. First, a tax on earnings encourages
thesubstitution of untaxed for taxed inputs. A tax on a part of earnings
encourages the substitution of untaxed for taxed labor——e.g., skilled
for unskilled workers, since a larger part of the earnings of the skilled
will be tax free (John Pencaval, 1970). Investment in specific training
provides returns to the firm that are not subject to the payroll tax,
since such investment and associated compensation policy raise worker
productivity by more than the wage. In addition, to the extent that
specifictraining adds to workers' earnings, itmay be expected to do so
ina range that is high enough not to be subject to the UI payroll tax.
Forthis reason, UI may encouragefurther investment in specific training,
therebyreducing the incidence of indefinite layoffs, separations for
other reasons and quits.
Second, as Brechling points out, the cost of turnover is increased
where there is a ceiling on the amountofwages subject to the payroll tax.
To the extent that firms share the benefits of specific training with the
workers, and in that way reduce turnover, specific training will also
reduce the cost to the firmofthe UI payroll tax) Thus, specific
trainingprovides an added benefit to the firm where the UI system exists
and is financed by a payroll tax system with a ceiling on taxable wage.
Third,to the extent that: a) the UI system encourages more extensive
1Nicholas M. Kiefer andGeorgeR. Neumann (1979) find that longer past
job tenure is associated with a larger decline in thereemploymentwage of
thoseseparated, implying that the loss of specific training to job changers
is greater for those who spent more time with their last employer.36
searchand brings about more perfect matches between potential employees
and jobs, and b) firms are more willing to invest in specific training
the more perfect the match, the UI system may encourage investment in
specific training. An implication, noted again in discussing implica-
tions for future research, is that the interaction between the UI system
and specific training might reduce the incidence of job separation and
increase job tenure.
One final point germane to a discussion of the impact of the UI
system on layoffs is suggested by comparing the list of theoretical
linkages between the UI system and unemployment related market flows
listed in Figure 1 with the theoretical linkages considered in the studies
reviewed above. The models already discussed—-—those analyzing the
influence of both temporary and permanent layoffs———assume that firms
and workers are risk neutral. They generally ignore any role for pure
insurance. A more complete approach would consider the relation of UI to
layoffs, occupational choice or firmhiringand inventory policy in a world
in which individuals and firms prefer to avoid risk. Martin Baily (1977b)
and Frank Stafford (1977) provide relevant discussions. Topel and Welch
(1979) also discuss relevant material on the role of unemployment
insurance as insurance.
Incidence of Quits: y
From the relation of the ui system to permanent layoff, we turn now to
consider the next labor market flow noted in the analytical framework for
which any relevant information is available--i.e., the incidence of quits.
In discussing studies of the relation of the UI system to the37
probabilibyof quitting and becoming unemployed, mention was made of
Marston's (1979) study—-—a study which considers only behavior on the
supply side of the market. Effects of the UI system on the firm's
incentive to pursue policies which reduce the incidence of quits is
considered by Brechling (1977). As was true in his analysis of permanent
layoffs, of central concern in Brechling's study is the incentive
createdby the impact of turnover on taxable payroll. In this analysis,
however, it plays the central role. The reason is that benefits paid
to someone who quits are not normally chargeable to the firm where the
personlast worked (Becker, 1972). Accordingly, the payroll tax rate
will not change as a direct result of any benefits drawn by the person
who quits. The only route by which such turnover canaffectpayroll
tax costs is through its impact on taxable payroll.
What does this mean for the relation of the firm's costs to the quit
rate? As has been pointed out, the steady state condition for equilibrium
in the UI system for firms with tax rates on the experience rated segment
oftheir tax schedule is that the flow of tax payments equal the flow
of benefit payments. Since quits raise taxable payroll in the same way
that permanent layoffs do, yet the flow of tax paymentsremains unchanged
forexperience rated firms, this must mean that the tax rate varies
negatively with quits in proportion to the positive variation in taxable
payroll.
1
1Notethat there will be a once andfor all increasein the stock of
requiredreserves associated with higher quit rates for a firm with a
taxrate that is on the experience rated portion of the tax schedule.38
Ofcourse, if the tax rate is not on the experience rated portion
of the taxschedule,then the flow of tax payments will be increased as
quitsincrease, providing the firmwithanincentive to reduce quits
byadjusting hiring orpersonnel policies or compensation. It should
bestressed that this taxable payroll effect attributable to the $6000
ceiling on taxable payroll provides an incentive to reduce turnover
even in the absence of chargeable benefits and isvery much magnified
wherethere is an absence of experience rating.
One part of the Brechling and Jehn study noted earlier uses data
on turnover in manufacturing by state and year to analyze the relation
of parameters of the UItaxsystem and of theceiling on taxable payroll
in the state to the incidence of quits. The most impressive results in
the quit equation are for the effect of the ceiling on taxable payroll.
Signs are as expected with t—ratios exceeding 1.5 in 10 of 16 two—digit
manufacturing industries) Indeed, in an equation for all manufacturing,
theceiling is found to have maximum effect on quits when it is roughly
onehalf of annual earnings, which is the value predicted by Brechling's
analysisof the relation between the marginal cost of a turnover and the
taxable wage base.
Again,these results are suggestive. But there are no controls for
individual characteristics or for the role of human capital. It wouldbe
quiteinteresting to carry on this type of analysis using a micro-data
sample where the state is identified, and if possible where some information
is given on job tenure (as in the Michigan Panel Study on .Income Dynamics
1For the four industries in which an incorrect sign is; found,none
of the relevant coefficients is significant.39
orthe Parnes Data).
interesting point about the effect of the ceiling on taxable
wages is that in a dynamic world with continuous turnover and replacement,
this is a feature of the UI system that acts to reduce turnover———having
the opposite effect on unemployment from other better known effects, such
asthose of UI benefits on duration.
Despite the potential effect of the ceiling on payroll subject to
UI taxes, results may sometimes be unaffected if a measure of the
ceiling is not included as anindependent variable in a cross—section
regressionrelating parameters of the tax system to unemployment. The
reason is that during some time periods, the value for the ceiling does
not vary very much among states. That is especially true if the Federal
ceiling has recently been increased.1 This does not mean, however, that
the effects of ceiling on turnover should be ignored in summing up the
impact of the UI system on unemployment. It does mean that difficulties
may be encountered in attempting to estimate its impact in cross—section
studies.
1The ceiling on the taxable payroll varies moderately among states,
and in some years very little. For example, some interstate variation
in the taxable wage is evident in the period covered by the Brechling-Jehn
study (1963—1967). At the end of the 1965 eighteen states had raised the
taxable wage base above the $3,000 federal level. For most of these
eighteen states the level was set at $3,600 (Merrill G. Murray, 1966, p. 36).
Ten years later only six states had tax bases exceeding the $4,200 federal
level which went into effect three years earlier (Hainermesh, 1977, p. 7) .If
there has been only limited variation in the ceiling on taxable payrolls,
this means that even though a study may have ignored the incentive for
limiting turnover from this source, estimates of other coefficients obtained
are not biased. The omitted independent variable was effectively held
constant.40
Interdependence Among Labor MarketFlows
Beforeleaving the discussion of how the UI system affects the
incidence of turnover from employment for various reasons, it is appro-
pritate to note that the incidence of temporary layoffs, permanent layoffs,
other job loss and quits may be jointly rather than independently determined.
Most of the studies of the impact of the UI system on these various
turnover rates do not consider such interdependence in formulating and
interpreting estimating equations.
Consider three reasons for the existence of interdependence in
turnover rates. First, as Stephen T. Marston (1979, p. 17) notes when
disucssing Feldstein's analysis of temporary layoffs: "If firms respond
(as Feldstein asserts) by increasing layoffs, some workers may be less
likely to quit, anticipating they will become unemployed anyway through
layoffs." Furthermore, It is especially important when longitudinal data
are used to consider the implications of quits from layoffs for inter-
dependence in the determination of temporary and permanent layoffs. For in
this case, temporary andpermanentlayoff are defined on an ex post basis.
Consequently, a quit from layoff turns what would otherwise be a temporary
spell of unemployment into a permanent one. A second reason why inter-
dependence may be important is provided by the human capital literature.
The analysis of specific training points to the very close relation between
the decisions to lay a worker off temporarily and permanently) Therole
of the UI system in influencing such decisions has been discussed
above. A third reason, namely potential
1
Gary S. Becker's (1975) book is a basis reference.41
interdependence between the quit rate and the rate of discharge for
cause,isdiscussed by JamesMedoff (1979) in the context of an analysis
ofthe impact of unions on layoffs.
An implication of such interdependence is that equations designed
to estimate the impact of the UI system on each type of turnover may
require a common set of explanatory variables. For example, even
though the cost of temporary layoffsto the firm is not likely to be
influencedby theceiling on payroll subject to the UItax, the relative
incidenceof temporary layoff may be influenced by the ceiling on taxable
payrollbecause the relative costs of quits and permanentlayoffsare
influenced by the height of the ceiling.
One more aspect of interdependence among labor market flows and
the potential impact of the UI system should be mentioned. The standard
approach to determining whether the UI system facilitates more efficient
search is to analyze the impact of UI benefits on wages subsequent to
unemployment (see, for example, Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Ronald Oaxaca,
1976) .FinisWelch (1977) haspointedout some difficulties with such
an approach. An alternative approach, consistent with our framework
for analysis, is to investigate whether higher UI benefits are associated
with another implied effect of a better job match—--stronger attachment
to the job. The better the match between a worker and a finn,theless
likely apermanent separation ought to be. This means that, other things
thesame, if the longer duration of unemployment brought about by the
availability of UI benefits is associated with more effective search and
a better match, a result may be a lower rate of incidence of permanent42
layoffs or quits in states which offer higher UI replacement rates.
Available studies do not provide reliable information about the
effects of UI benefits on incidence of permanent turnover. For example,
in the case of quits, neither the Brechling and Jehn study nor the
Mars ton study provides an indication of whether the incidence of quits
orquit unemployment is reduced in states that offer higher UI benefits.
TheBrechling and Jehn study includes no measure of UI benefits.
Marston's measure of UI benefits is weighted by the probability it
will be received by a person who quits. This is inappropriate if one
is trying to isolate the effect of duration in the previous spell on the
probability of a subsequent quit.
A second measure of firmer job attachment is job tenure. However,
to produce a reliable analysis of the impact of UI on job tenure or
permanent turnover, a more detailed modeling effort which spells out
the role playedby specific training and theimplications of the UI system
forjob tenure and turnoveris required.
Numberof Spells
Having discussed the impact of the UI system on the incidence of
a separation from past employment, consider its impact on a measure
related to incidence———the number of spells per person. A technique for
measuringthe probability of repeated spells andattemptingto isolate
the role of heterogeneity———that is, individual specific characteristics
leading to repeated separations and spells of unemployment———is discussed
by Linda Leighton and Jacob Mincer (1979). It would be of interest to43
determinehow much,if any, of the impact of the UI system is due to
itseffect on the likelihood of repeated spells of unemployment rather
than to its impact on the probability of a random individual experiencing
atleast one separation. While the data are available for such an
investigation,it has not been undertaken.
If we are to understand the relation of UI to unemployment associated
with repeated spells, the following questions should be investigated:'
•Do UI benefits andtaxesaffect the likelihood of individuals
experiencingrepeated spells of unemployment? Of repeated spells
resulting in permanent separation?
•What portion of the probability of repeated spells andof total
timespent unemployed is due to individual differences in preference or
individual characteristics (heterogeneity) and what part is due to the
fact that a person with short tenure on the current job has a greater
likelihood of turnover? How does UI influence this outcome?
E.The Impact of UI on the Probability of Unemployment Conditional on a
Turnover,z'.
1
Therehas been no separate study of the relation of parameters of the
UI system to the probability of unemployment conditional on a turnover.
1Heterogeneitymay affect duration as well as indidence of unemploy-
ment. More specifically, heterogeneity may lead to adverse selection as
those with a strong preference for leisure time choose jobs where permanent
separation is more likely and then prolong their spells. Additional questions
for future investigation are;
Does duration differ for those experiencing repeated spells? Is the
impact of UI on duration different for those experiencing repeated spells?44
Onemightexpectthat in thecaseof a temporary layoff there is little
room for the tjl system to affect the value of such a probability. On
the other hand, it may be argued that the propensity to locate a job
before quitting and thus avoid experiencing unemployment varies
negatively with the expected value of UI benefits to those who quit.
But, as noted, Marston's (1979) findings do not support this argument.
Itmight be expected that UI benefits affect the probability of
unemployment by influencing the probabilityof an unemployed person--—
eitheron temporarylayoff or permanently separated—--taking a temporary
position, perhaps on a part—time basis. This effect should depend on
boththe relative level of UI benefits andthe waythese benefits are
reduced in the face of part—time work. Raymond Munts (1970) presents
evidence that work activity is influenced by rules governing the payment
of partial benefits.
F.The Impact of the UI System on the Stocks of Those Employed and Not In
theLabor Force: S.'
1
Ifthe UI system affects transition rates into and out of employment
and thereby the stock of unemployed, it also affects the stocks of the
employed and those not in labor force. There are at least three reasons
why, as part of our analysis of the impact of UI on unemployment, we
should be interested in determining the effects of the UI system on. the
number employed and not in the labor force. First, as demonstrated in
Section I, a portion of the effect of the UI system on unemployment
results from its impact on these stocks. Accordingly, to determine the45
full impact of UI on unemployment, its impact on the number employed or
not in the labor force must be understood.
Second, it is important to determine Whether any increases ——or,
in certain instances, decreases ——inthe number of unemployed attribut-
able to the UI system come from its effect on employment or the number
not in the labor force. Most crucially, we would like to know whether any
addition to the stock of unemployed represents a real effect of a reporting
effect. It is a real effect if those who would have been employed in
the absence of UI choose unemployment because of its availability. It
is a reporting effect if, for example, some put off exit from the labor
force in order to remain qualified for UI benefits.
Third, the fact that certain aspects of the UI system may affect
the stocks of those employed or not in the labor force provides further
opportunity to test for the empirical importance of effects suggested by
various theories.
Three recent studies which consider the effects of the UI system
on employment and/or not in labor force time will be mentioned. One is
a study of seasonal employment patterns by Terrance C. Halpin (1979).
The second is a study by Daniel Harnermesh (1979a) which examines UI
induced effects on labor force participation that, in turn, are reflected
in employment. Hamermesh's is a supply side study of behavior in the
short term and is based on data for married women. The third is a study
1An alternative is to use the estimates of the impact of UI on the
nine transition rates among the three states of unemployment, employment
and not in the labor force to produce an estimate of the full impact of
UI on unemployment. For a discussion of the appropriate formulae, see
Stephen T. Marston (1976) and Ronald G. Eherenberg (1979).46
by Gary Solon (1979) concerning the effects of extended benefits on
unemployment, employment and not in labor force status for a sample of
the long term unemployed.
There are two important innovations in Halpin's study. First, he
includes as an independent variable a measure designed to capture
seasonal shifts in the demand curve (weather conditions by state). The
presence of a direct measure of the position of the demand curve acts
to reduce specification error in a study such as his which draws on
demand side behavior. Second, he makes an effort to measure directly
the degree of experience rating. He finds that for two of three
industries examined, more perfect experience rating is associated with
reduced seasonal employment fluctuations.1
Two effects are considered in Hamermesh's study. On the one hand,
women who work and earn beyond a threshold level this period are entitled
to receive UI benefits next period, if they become unemployed for
acceptable reasons next period. Moreover, once having qualified for the
minimum, higher earnings raise benefits, at least up to the maximum.
The fact that working in the current period increases potential benefits
in future periods provides an added incentive to work.2 The more
generous the UI benefits, the stronger the "entitlement effect" should
be. On the other hand, once a person has qualified for UI benefits,
1The dependent variable is a measure basedon spectral analysis of
the seasonal patterns in employment.
2Unless, of course, there is a fully compensating wage differential.47
since higher benefits lower the price of unemployment relative to employ-
ment, higher benefits may discourage work effort. Using data from the
Panel Study on Income Dynamics, Hamerinesh finds evidence for both of
these effects, but finds they are largely offsetting.
Using a survey of people who had exhausted their regular UI
benefits, but who were not equally qualified to receive extended benefits,
Gary Solon found, for a sample of workers in New York State, that those
who were eligible for extended UI benefits were unemployed for a longer
time, and that, other things the same, they spent less time employed or
not in the labor force. Eligibility for extended benefits caused a
different response for those who had been unemployed in at least two of
the last five years than for those who had not. The "repeaters" were
more likely to reduce employment time, spending more time unemployed
if they were eligible for extended benefits. Nonrepeaters
spent more time inemployed at the expense of time that would have been
spent out of the labor force. There is some question about these
results because Solon indicates there was a high correlation between
the labor market conditions a worker faced and eligibility for extended
benefits. Nevertheless, the questions asked are quite important and
should be investigated in a cross—section setting for a more representa—
time sample of the unemployed.48
G.Impact of UI on Unemployment Duration: d.
There has been a great deal of work, both theoretical andempirical,
attempting to explai.n how and why the UI system affects unemployment
duration. The empirical work, which has applied a variety of econometric
techniquesto analyze data from a number of different sources, suggests,
consistent with the bulk of the theory, that higher UI benefits are
associatedwith longer spells of unemployment.1 Indeed, it is fair to
say that the positive relationship between weekly benefits and duration
is the most reliable result we have on the impact of the UI system.
Despite this, it should be recognized that we do not have enough in-
formation to fill in the bottom row of the table in Figure 1, thereby
indicating the effectsof thevariousfeatures of the UIsystem on duration
ofunemploymentfor those experiencing unemployment for different reasons.
Usually, an "average" duration is calculated for a group which includes
individuals unemployed for a number of different reasons. The group may
include all the unemployed or all the insured unemployed, all job changers
or insured job changes.2
1Findingson the impact of UI benefits on transition rates out of
unemploymentare not as extensive as those on duration. Normally, studies
ofUI's impact on transition rates focus on the effects of UI coverage,
but not on the impact of variation in benefit levels.(E.g., see John M.
Barron and Wesley Mellow, 1979.). Since UI coverage is endogenous, care is
required in interpreting thesefindings. The related problem in duration
studiesis selection into samples of covered workers.
2There are some exceptions. E.g., as will be mentioned below, Kathleen
P. Classen's (1979) study analyzes the determinants of duration separately
for those insured unemployed who are on recall layoff. But most studies
do not separate the unemployed by reason for unemployment before analyzing
UI's impact on duration.49
Since, as Feldstein (1975) (1978) has noted, duration varies by
reason for unemployment, if benefit replacement rates do not have the
same effect on the incidence of unemployment for different reasons,
variation of average duration of an unemployment spell will reflect
theinfluence of two forces——the impact of variation in parameters of
the UI system on duration and its impact on the mix of unemployed by
reasonfor unemployment. Suppose, for example, that the equation for
estimating duration is of the form:
d =f(UIB,CD, w, x)
where d is the duration of unemployment, UIB is some measure of benefits,
CD is the period of covered duration, W is the past wage and X is a
set of supply side demographic and human capital characteristics.
From Equation 6, Section I, we have
U = •d.
That is, unemployment is equal to the product of average incidence (ti)
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That is, since average duration is equal to the sum of the products of
incidence and duration by reason for unemployment divided by total inci-
dence, d' depends not only on the effects of variation in benefits on
duration by reason for unemployment (each of the d), but also on the
level of incidence by reason and variation in incidence by reason resulting
from variation in benefi,ts.
Havingnoted that the dependent variables used in most duration
studies measure duration for an aggregated group of those who are unemployed
for different reasons, and also having noted the consequences of this
fact, consider now the information that is available on the impact of
UI on duration for groups unemployed for different reasons.
Durationof Temporary Layoff Unemployment, d
The theory relating the UI system to the duration of temporary
layoffunemployment is an extension of that in the Baily-Feldstein
models. Just as the UI subsidy (imperfect experience rating and the
tax break) may encourage the incidence of temporary layoff unemployment1 a
liighersubsidymayleadto the prolongation of spells. Whether duration is51
increasedwhere the subsidyishigher depends on the impact of the subsidy
on the relative incidence of shorter spells.
Findings from two studies will be noted. Classen (1979) calculated
the impact of UI benefits separately for those recalled by their initial
employers. The UI parameters in her estimating equation referred only
to the benefit formulae. Administrative data from Pennsylvania and
Arizonawere used as a basis for analysis. The coefficient estimated
for the benefit measure is two to three times smaller in the equations
estimatedfor those recalled by their previous employers than in the
equations for those not recalled.
Frank Brechling (1979) has tried to test an extension of the Feldstein-
Baily model by including tax parameters as explanatory variables in a
duration equation. 1-us observations are by state and by year. However,
the dependent variable used is average duration of unemployment by state
computed for the entire group of unemployed in the state, whatever the
reason for their unemployment.Moreover, none of the exogenous measures
includedby Feldstein (1978) in his analysis are standardized for by
Brechling in his. As a result, it would seemmost prudent to view this
study (as does Brechling) as a first, rough attempt at analyzing the
impact of the tax side of the UIsystemon duration of temporary layoff
unemployment. Brechling finds that the parameters of the UI tax system
have a systematic relation in the expected direction to overall duration.
Less perfect experience rating is associated with longer spells. With
taxvariables in the equation, the benefit measure does not have a
significant impact, although the sign on the benefit variable is positive.52
Duration of Unemployment for Permanent Layoffs, Other Job Losers and
Job Leavers, d, d, d'
As noted in the beginning of this section, separate findings are
not available for the impact of UI on duration for those who were
permanently laid off, lost their job for other reasons or quit.(Moreover,
those on temporary layoff are often included in the same sample-withtheseothers.)1
Accordingly, this part of the discussion of the impact of UI on duration,
by necessity, is based on results for these groups taken together.
The features of the UI system of greatest importance to these
analyses are the benefit level or replacement rate and the potential
duration of benefits. Job search requirements andeligibilityrules
maybe important, but their effects are not normally standardized for
inavailable studies.(See, however, the studies by Arlene Holen and
Stanley Horowitz, 1974, and Stanley Horowitz, 1977).)
To avoid needless duplication with previous surveys which have
covered both the relevant theory and empirical work explaining the impact
of the benefit replacement rate on unemployment duration, let me cite
conclusions from two of the major surveys of this literature and then
go on to discuss the impact of potential duration on actual duration.2
Based on his survey, Hamermesh (1977) concludes "that a 10—percentage
point increase in the gross replacement rate leads to an increase in the
'There has been an effort in some studies to analyze separately those
who are unemployed for different reasons. For example, in addition to
Classen's study, Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Ronald Oaxaca (1976) separate
out from their samples those on temporary layoff. Also, there is the work
of Henry E. Felder (1978) on duration and disqualifications which is dis-
cussed below. Finally, in their study of differences in transition
probabilities out of unemployment associated with UI coverage, Barron
and Mellow (1979a) include as independent variables a set of dummies to
indicate the reason for unemployment.
2For anoverview of recent developments in the theory, see Steven A.
LippmanandJohnJ.McCall (1979).53
durationof insured unemployment of about half a week when labor markets
are tight" (p. 37). Topel and Welch's best guess is that a.l increase
inthe benefit replacement ratio extends the average unemployment spell
by 1.2 weeks for job changers(p. 84).
Some of the studies covered in these surveys were based on program
data from state UI systems. Dependent variables in these studies are
truncated because the length of the recorded spell is limited by maximum
weeks of compensated unemployment, so that unemployment beyond the
time when benefits are exhausted or before the time when potenXial recipients
register for benefits is not recorded. More recent studies, such as those
by Floyd C. Newton and Harvey Rosen (1979) andClassen(1979), employ
maximum likelihood techniques to deal with truncation, at least on the
far end of the spell. Their findings are consistent with those of
earlier studies.
Turn now to consider the impact of potential duration of UI benefits
onactualduration of unemployment. Findings as to the impact of
maximumpotential duration are mixed.1 One problem is that program data
may not provide much variation in maximum potential duration because
many observedindividuals are at the maximuw, especially in states where
thosewho are eligible for benefits at all are made eligible for the
maximum duration allowable. Another is that the required estimating
'Forexample, Ehrenberg, and Oaxaca (1976) find no significant
impact of potential duration, Newton and Rosen (1979) find there is one
and Classen (1979) finds a significant impact in one of twostates
examined.54
procedure is quite complicated because the UI budget constraint changes
slope at the point where UI benefits run out. Thus the opportunity
costof unemployment is increased to the full foregone wage for weeks
beyond the maximum. As a result, the opportunity cost relevant to
an individual's marginal decision is endogenous.
Inone of the most technically sophisticated of the studies of this
subject, Robert Moffitt and Walter Nicholson (1979) focus on the impact
ofFederal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) on duration. By extending
potential duration by 26 weeks, this program created wide variation
inpotential duration during a time of cyclical downturn. They con-
cluded that "an increase of one week in potential duration resulted
in a .1 week increase in weeks unemployed. .the entire FSB program
resulted in increasing weeks unemployed by about 2.5 weeks." (pp. 34-35)
A third feature of the UI benefit structure is the disqualification
provisions. Henry E. Felder (1978)has used program data to compare
thedifferences in duration between those disqualified from receiving
UIbenefits for various reasons on the one hand and all qualified
recipientsonthe other. His results suggest that those permanently
disqualifiedfrom receiving benefits during a given spell because they
quit their last job areunemployed for a shorter period of time than
are those who are qualified for benefits. Since the group who are
qualified includes those on temporary layoff and the duration of their
unemployment is short, the difference brought about by permanent dis-
qualification may be somewhat understated. Felder also finds that
thosewho quit and are disqualified for a waiting period, but not for55
thefull duration of the spell:1 have longer spells than qualified
recipients, as do those who are disqualified for declining suitable
work. The results for those discharged for misconduct vary among states.
Separate duration equations are not presented for those who quit, were
discharged for cause, etc.
New Entrants d
It has also been argued that duration of unemployment for new entrants
may be affected by the UI system. One reason may be that the sooner a
job is accepted, the sooner one is eligible for potential future benefits
(Hamermesh, 1977, p. 37).
On apriori grounds one would not expect this type of effect to play
a major role in influencing duration of entry level unemployment; but
there is no evidence either way.
Future Research on Duration
What are the questions that need to be answered if the effects of
the UI system on duration are to be pinned down more precisely? First,
more disaggregation is called for so that the differential effects of
the UI system on duration by reason for unemployment canbeunderstood.
Second, it is important to determine the size of errors which have been
introduced because the measures representing benefits or taxes are
endogenous to the analysis. This is most obvious when actual benefit
replacement rates, or measures such as the fraction of benefits paid to
employeesof firms paying the maximum tax are used. But even parameters
of a state's benefit and tax system may be endogenous, especially in
viewof the fact that over the long term, benefit andtaxpayments must56
1
balance at the state level.One would expect that the greater the degree
of aggregation, and thus the less important the role of differences among
individuals or firms in determining the error term, the more serious these
simultaneous equations problems will be.
Third, if we are to zero in on the effects of the UI system on duration,
we need a careful effort to catalogue the differences in findings that are
associated with using different data sets, or more broadly, different defini-
tions of labor market flows. There are at least four major categories of
surveys used to test theories of the relation of unemployment insurance to
unemployment -—CPStype surveys, the BLS employer surveys (observations by
state, industry and year) ,longitudinalsurveys, such as the Parnes data and
Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and surveys based on program
data which include only those who are in employment covered by the UI system
or are receiving UI benefits. Different surveys define differently some
of the unemployment related flows. (Martin S. Feldstein [1975) discusses
some of these differences.)
The CPS measures current unemployment and duration of incomplete spells
for the five subgroups of the unemployed noted in Figure 1. Further informa-
tion can be gained either by matching panels from the CPS and calculating
flows as changes in status between survey periods (Clark and Summers, 1979,
Barron and Mellow 1979), or by calculating escape rates from the information
on duration of incomplete spells of unemployment and using them to estimate
the duration of completed spells.
The longitudinal surveys are used to provide information on the
incidence and duration of completed spells. However, even though
1Note also that if the legislature takes local economic circumstances
into account in designing the UI system, this may cause the parameters of
that system to be endogenous in many analyses. See Hamermesh (1978b) for
some discussion of this issue.57
longitudinalsurveys provide information aboutstatusduring the week
of the survey, in an effort to take advantage of the unique characteristics
of these surveys, temporary layoff is normally defined in an expost
rather than exante sense as in the cPS(e.g.,see Leighton and Mincer,
1979, and Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976). Thus, for example, those that
quit from temporary layoff unemployment and secure a job for a new
employer are counted in these surveys as permanent layoffs. Program
data utilize similar definitions, but as noted above the sample covered
by program data is censored andappropriateadjustments are required.
In addftion, different data sets incorporate different measures of
exogenous influences. A systematic attempt should be made to catalogue
the effects of including or excluding particular subsets of exogeneous
variables to reveal how much of the differences among studies reflect
differences in specification of the estimating equation.
Fourth, although studies of duration are based on longitudinal
data, they normally do not distinguish between effects of the UI system
on the behavior of those who frequently experience spells of unemployment
as compared to those who do not. If we are to isolate parameters that
truely reflect the impact of the UI program on an individuals' behavior,
it is important to standardize for the effects of the heterogeneity
(e.g., see Solon (1979)).
Fifth, it may be useful to distinguish spells that end out
of the labor force from those that end in a new job. We are just begin-
ning to consider this distinction in analyzing the impact of unemployment
insurance.58
III.Summary and Implications for Further Research
Inthe first part of this paper, a framework for viewing develop-
ments in the literature analyzing the relation of unemployment insurance
to unemployment was constructed. That framework provided an outline for
section II, which contained a discussion of recent developments in
that literature. In the process of discussing the literature,
an effort was made to point to important questions which, if answered,
would lead to a more complete understanding of how the UI system affects
unemployment.
This concluding section will attempt to summarize briefly some
major points raised in the discussion and to highlight some of the
broader questions for future research that are suggested by the foregoing
review. The more specific questions that arose during the course of dis-
cussing particular developments in the literature will not, however,
be repeated.
Temporary Layoff Unemployment
Consider first the available information concerning the relation of
the UI system to temporary layoff unemployment. The basic theoretical
work has been carried out by Baily (1977) and Feldstein (1976). There
is one major empirical study (Feldstein, 1978) focussing directly on
the impact of UI on the level of temporary layoff unemployment. In
addition, Brechling (1976) has pointed out how parameters of the UI tax
system might be incorporated into this framework.59
Less information is available on the effect of the UI system on
the probabilities which underlie the level of temporary layoff unem-
ployment. Brechling's work on the incidence of temporary layoff is
very rough. There is no empirical work analyzing the relation
of UI to the conditional probability of unemployment given a temporary
layoff (although this probability may be high and not very much affected
by UI) .Moreover,of the two studies focusing on UI's impact on duration
of temporary layoff unemployment, one (Classen, 1978) focuses only on
a supply side explanation, and the other [Brechling (1979)1 isbased
on highly aggregated data.
The information we have on the impact of the UI system on the
incidence and duration of temporary layoff unemployment confirms the
direction of Feldstein's findings. But the size of the effect found
in his study is very large. In view of the importance of this effect,
and since his study did not control for interstate differences in the
degree of experience rating, an important priority for future research
is to attempt to confirm or refute Feldstein's findings, while incorporating
innovations suggested by Brechling.
Permanent Layoff Unemployment
The review of findings on the impact of UI on permanent layoff
unemployment has indicated that these results are incomplete. Only
limited work on the relation of UI to the incidence of permanent layoff
unemploymenthas been carried out. That work, which is mainly due to
Brechling and Jehn (1978),analyzesthe impact of UIon theincidence of60
total layoffs arid recalls. Direct evidence concerning the size of the
impact of the UI system on the incidence of permanent layoffs or on
unemployment conditional on permanent layoffs is not available. Moreover,
while duration studies confirm that the impact of UI benefits is in
the expected direction, most of the duration studies do not separate
individualsby reason for unemployment. Additional work aimed at
spelling out the structual relations underlying the incidence of per-
manent layoffsby merging supply and demand based models, and providing
estimates of UI's impact on duration for those on permanent layoff,
could help us to zero in on a point estimate of the effects of the UI
system on permanent layoff unemployment.
Other Job Loss, Quits and Entry
similar comments to theabove apply to the information that is
requiredif we are to come closer to having point estimates of the
impact of the UI system on unemployment associated with other job
loss or quits. Some work on the supply side is available relating
UI benefits to the incidence of quit unemployment. But there is none on
therelation of the UI to the incidence of unemployment from other job
loss,to the probability components of unemployment due to other job
loss, or to entry unemployment.
Gaps In the TheoryandImplications for Estimation
Afew more general comments about gaps in the theory are in order.
It has been apparent throughout the discussionthat more work is needed
analyzingthe relations between the UI system and specific training on
the one hand and layoff policies of the firms or corresponding supply61
side incentives to quit on the other. Relatedly, we have no information
on the positive aspects of the impact of the UI system on unemployment -
i.e.,or any reduction in the incidence of unemployment over the long
term and, perhaps, increases in job tenure due to improved job matches
resulting from prolonged search financed by UI benefits.
In addition, it would be useful if theoretical analyses of the
relation of UI to unemployment incidence placed more emphasis on the
roles of risk and uncertainty, and if they considered more fully the
implications of heterogeneous preferences.
The UI System
The effects of two features of the UI system deserve closer study.
The feature are the ceiling on taxable wages and the procedures for determin-
ing eligibility and qualification for UI benefits. It is particularly
important to isolate the impact of the ceiling and to determine how
important it is because it may operate systematically to reduce turnover
with replacement, and thus in contrast with many of UI's effects, to reduce
unemployment. The impact of the maximum taxable salary on turnover rates
has been examined using aggregated data for manufacturing by Brechling
and Jehn (1978), but more detailed work is called for using micro data.
This work will be difficult to accomplish because, at times, the interstate
variation in the maximum yearly wage subject to UI tax is limited.
To summarize the findings, when one proceeds systematically through
the analytical framework presented in section I and compares it to the
topics considered in the available literature, a guide to future research
emerges. We have seen that certain labor market flows which determine
in part the number who are unemployed, and which may be influenced by62
the characteristics of the UI system, have not been studied. Other
relevant labor market flows have been studied, but only partially.
In addition, some aspects of the behavior of individuals andfirms
whichmaybe altered in response to incentives provided by the UI
system have not yet been considered. And the impact of certain features
of the UI system has yet to be fully analyzed.
It has also been seen that if results from various empirical
studies are to be reconciled, an effort has to made to put together
on a systematic basis information indicating how differences ih the
dataemployed, econometric techniques used and specification of
estimating equations affect empirical findings.
This paper has drawn on a large body of information pertaining
tothe impact of the unemployment insurance systemon unemployment.
Itisobvious that significant progress nas been made, and that much
ofthe information that has been accumulated can be very useful to
those responsible for designingthe UIprogram. This information is
especiallyusefulwhen it is viewed within the context of an appropriate
analytical framework. Yet, when viewed in this context, it is also
apparent that a great deal of work remains to be done.63
Appendix
Worker Heterogeneity and Adverse Selection: 2½n Examp
The role of moral hazard provides one explanationfor the observed
positive relation between the level of UIbenefits and unemployment
duration (see for example Steven Shavell and Laurence Weiss,1979).
This appendix provides an example in which workerswith the strongest
preference for nonmarket time may select thoseoccupations where
permanent separation occurs most frequently,taking advantage of the
availability of UI benefits to further increasetheir yearly unemployment.
While in this example there is full coverage,soavailability of UI benefits
does not influence the choice of industry by workers,it is seen that
because those who have the strongest preferencefor nonmarket time will
choose to work in industries where unemploymentis most likely, the effect
of such occupational choice is to magnify the impactof moral hazard.
This adverse selection is seen to operate in thatworkers with a strong
preference for nonmarket time chooseindustries where unemployment, rather
than UI coverage, is more likely.
To highlight the mechanism and to simplifythe example, it will be
assumed that there is no uncertainty about demandfluctuations and that
workers have full information about employment prospects,so there is no
need for search. It will also be assumed thatthe UI system is fully
experience rated. The imperfection whichaccounts for the effect of UI
on duration is an assumed inability of firms to determine which workers have
a strong preference for time awayfrom the job)
1Firms with experience rated UI would have an incentive to screen out
such workers, or to offer them a lower wage,but in this example, do not
do so successfully.64
To be more specific, assume there are two industries, A andB,
and workers in both industries are covered by unemployment insurance.
Further assume that it is known with certainty that in A there will be
no unemployment, while in B there will be a layoff for one of n periods.'
The layoff is treated as permanent, although in the period following
thelayoff anyone who wants to work can find a job at one firm or another
inthe industry. Insteadof returning to work after one period, however,
employeesare assumed to have the option of extending the spell of
uneixploymentfor another period, while remaining covered by unemploy-
ment insurance. This option corresponds to the possibility that unemploy-
ment may be voluntarily prolonged even though the search required to
qualify for UI benefits is "formally" met by the unemployed worker.
Yearly earnings and the per period wage rate are reported in Panel
I of Table 1 for the dominant group of workers, who, for purposes of
example, are assumed to place a zero value on any nonmarket time arising
from layoff. This group, through its mobility and dominance of employment,
determines what the wage structure will be. Another smaller group
exhibits a positive preference for nonmarket activities. They allocate
themselves among industries in light of this wage structure and employ-
ment prospects, choosing that industry which offers the most attractive
combination of earnings, UI benefits and leisuretime. Finally, for
convenience, assumethat industry A, the industry for which there is no
possibility of unemployment is very large. As a result, itis possible
toignore anyadjustmentsin the yearly wage paid in that industry as
'Once laid off, it takesone period to locate a job in any industry.65
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labor shifts into B. A full analysis must, of course, relax each of
these simplifying assumptions.
The following notation is used:
w =Yearlyearnings in industry A, the dominant industry with
no unemployment
n =Numberof periods per year
cx =Proportionaterate of replacement for earnings by UI
(t) Value associated with t periods unemployment for those
with a positive preference for nonmarket time.
It can be seen from Panel I that for those who attach no value to noninarket
time,labor mobility causes wage rate adjustments which equalize the total
returns to working in each industryat w(Column 3). This is so whatever
thelevel of UIbenefits or average unemployment experience. Moreover, as
longas cc, thereplacementrate for UI, is less than one, with 13(t) =0
for Group I no one who works in industry B will choose to exercise an
option to take an extra period of unemployment.(It is easyto derive
analogousconditions under the assumption that for the majority group
13(t) >0,but is less than the value of leisure for the minority group.)
Pane].IIexamines the casefor that smaller group of workers for
whomthere is a positive value to time spent not at work—-i.e., for whom
13(t) >0.There are few enough of them so that the wage rate structure
they face is independent of their behavior. Their yearly earnings are
obtained by multiplying the wage rate by n or n -1periods, depending on
whether there is mandatory unemployment associated with their industry.
The calculation in the last row is made to illustrate the value of choosing67
asecond period of unemployment. The total value of each choice is equal
tothe value of earnings plus the UI payment replacing wages at the rate
oftimes the number of periods unemployed, plus the value of noninarket
time. From these results, conditions under which those with a preference
for nonmarket time will choose to lengthen their unemployment after
choosing to work where unemployment is expected with certainty can be
determined.
Note that since wages reflect the preferences of Group I so that mone-
tary returns are equal in both industries, those in Group II with a pref-
erence for nonmarket time will sort themselves into industry B. The value
oftotal returns there is higher for themthanit is in A,where there is
no unemployment. The difference is equal to the value they place on non—
market time. A central question is under what conditions will those in
Group II choose to lengthen their unemployment voluntarily beyond the
mandatory period length, and iftheydo, what role will unemployment in-
surance play?The condition for staying unemployed two periods rather
than one is that
w [(n —2)+2°j
(n —1)+ + 13(2)> w+13(1)
or
1 - (13 —13) > w
2 1o(n-l)+
More simply, the worker with a positive preference for nonmarket time will
choose an extra period of unemployment if time away from the job is valued68
atmore thanforegoneearnings not covered by UI benefits.
In sum, this examplepoints outthat if labor allocates itself among
jobs in such a way that those with the strongest preference for uriemploy-
ment are concentrated where permanent separation is most likely to occur,
the potential for UI benefits to have an adverse impact on duration
is increased) Most studies of duration, however, have not
tested for and do not control for the influence of heterogeneity of
worker preferences.
related point is made by Gary Solon (1979) with regard to the
effect of UI on labor force participation. He points out, that if UI
encourages participation, it does so for those most prone to long spells
of unemployment. Solon is careful to note, however, that by increasing
participation by those with a weak preference for work, UI is not
creating a disincentive for work. In contrast, UI does create such a
disincentivein the above example.69
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